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Abstract
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show a unique and efficient outcome in a
model of multilateral bargaining. We show that the predictability of the
model critically depends on the nature of the surplus i.e. whether it is con-
tinuous or discrete. We show that the model suffers from multiple equilibria
and severe inefficiency when the surplus is discrete, not continuous as as-
sumed in Krishna and Serrano (1996), and players are patient enough.
Keywords: Multilateral bargaining, Discrete surplus, Inefficiency
JEL codes: C72, C78
1 Introduction
Rubinstein (1982) obtains unique and efficient equilibrium in a model of bilat-
eral bargaining under very reasonable assumptions. Hence, it is natural for studies
on multilateral bargaining to model the problem as extension of Rubinstein (1982)
game. However, most of these studies have failed to repeat the success of Rubin-
stein model. For example, Shaked (credited by Sutton (1986)), Cai (2000, 2003)
and Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012) analyse multilateral bargaining under
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different protocols1, yet, they all discover the same result that multilateral bar-
gaining suffers from multiplicity of equilibria and inefficiency.
Krishna and Serrano (1996)’s work, however, stands out. They show unique
and efficient equilibrium in a n-player game, in which each player takes turn to
offer a distribution of the surplus and others respond. Those who accept, take their
share and exit the game. While the rest of the players continue to bargain over the
leftover surplus in same fashion. We call this the “exit” game.2
In this paper, we answer the following question. Does the “exit” game retains
its predictability if the surplus is discrete, and not continuous as assumed by Kr-
ishna and Serrano (1996)?3 In real life, value as measured in currency terms is
discrete. All the transactions must be an integer multiple of the smallest currency
unit. We show that under such realistic constraint, the results of Krishna and Ser-
rano (1996) break down. If players are patient enough, not only any distribution of
the surplus can be supported in an equilibrium, any amount of delay including per-
petual delay can be sustained as well (see proposition 1, 2 and 3). We get this folk
theorem kind of result because we are able to devise punishment strategies to pre-
vent any deviation from the norm. The proposer and the responders are punished
for deviating from the specified strategies, hence maintaining the equilibrium.
There is an alternate perspective to look at this paper. While the “exit” game
has unique outcome, the “unanimity” game, studied by Shaked, suffers from con-
tinuum of equilibria. The only modelling difference between the two games is
the following. In the “unanimity” game, the surplus is divided only after all re-
sponders unanimously accept a proposal, whereas in the “exit” game, individual
players can accept the proposal and exit with their share. This implies that the
“exit” feature is responsible for the (significant) improvement in the predictabil-
ity of the model. Now, Van Damme et al (1990) and Muthoo (1991) show that
the Rubinstein (1982) model’s predictability vanishes under discrete surplus i.e.
it suffers from multiple equilibria. Hence, by modelling two opposite forces, the
1The bargaining protocols in these papers have Rubinsteinian features of alternating offers and
infinite horizon. At the same time, they have significant differences as well. For example, the bar-
gaining in Cai (2000, 2003) is strictly sequential, but the other two papers allow for simultaneous
bargaining as well. In Shaked’s model, all players are identical, whereas in the other two models,
there is a central player (buyer) who offers in alternate periods.
2The labels, “exit” and “unanimity”, for the respective games are borrowed from Krishna and
Serrano (1996). The label “unanimity” refers to the game studied by Shaked (see introductory
paragraph).
3Discrete surplus results in multiplicity of equilibria and extreme inefficiency in Rubinstein
(1982) game. This justifies our selection of the “exit” model, since other models suffer from those
shortcomings even when the surplus is continuous (see introductory paragraph).
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“exit” and the discrete surplus, in the basic “unanimity” game, we are able to
compare their effect and observe which one is more potent. By demolishing the
predictability of the “exit” game, the discrete surplus turns out to be the more
forceful one.
In section 2, we present the model, which we analyse in section 3 and finally,
we conclude the paper in section 4.
2 Model
There are n(≥ 3) players bargaining to distribute a surplus, which is discrete
and consists of s units. A unit is not further divisible, hence, there are finite
number of ways in which the surplus can be distributed. Let the players be denoted
by numbers 1 to n. A distribution vector or agreement vector is a vector of units
obtained by the n players. We represent it by x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where xi is the
number of units obtained by the player i. The set of possible distributions, when
the number of players is m and the surplus available is s, is defined below.4
X(m, s) = {x ∈ Nm0 :
m∑
i=1
xi = s} (1)
Let {1, 2, ..., n} be an exogenously given list of the n players. In period 1, first
player in the list i.e. player 1 proposes a distribution x ∈ X(n, s), while other
players respond. Responders, who accept the proposal, are paid as specified by
the proposal , and leave the game forever. In case one or more responders reject
the proposal, the game enters second period in which all those who rejected the
proposal and the proposer of previous period, bargain over the leftover surplus in
similar fashion. Leftover surplus is the original surplus minus the payments made
for all the exits in the previous periods. Proposer in a period t + 1 is the player
next to the proposer of period t in the list and who is still remaining in the game.5
The new proposer offers one of the possible distributions of the leftover surplus,
as defined in (1). The game continues this way till all but one players exit the
game, leaving the remaining player with the leftover surplus.
All players are risk neutral. They all discount at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1) per period. It
is a complete information game, hence, we use subgame perfect nash equilibrium
(SPE) to analyse the same. Henceforth, the term equilibrium implies SPE.
4The notation N0 refers to the set of the natural numbers and zero.
5Imagine the list to be circular. Hence, after player n, it is player 1’s turn to propose if he is
still in the game.
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We introduce some notations and definitions to facilitate the analysis that fol-
lows. Let N be the set of all the n players. The notation G(m, s) represents a
game (or subgame) starting with m players and a surplus of s units. Hence, the
game described above is represented by G(n, s). An equilibrium is efficient if
it ends the game in the first period. If an equilibrium is not efficient, then it is
inefficient.
3 Analysis
The subgame G(2, s), where s > 0, is the Rubinstein (1982) game with dis-
crete surplus, studied by Van Damme et al (1990) and Muthoo (1991). Following
three results are reproduced from Van Damme et al (1990), Muthoo (1991) and
Krishna and Serrano (1996) for the purpose of comparative analysis. Additionally,
lemma V.1 is used in the proofs later on.
Lemma V. 1 Consider the subgame G(2, s), where s > 0. For δ > s−1
s
, every
possible split of s, including zero for either of the players, can be sustained in an
equilibrium.6
Lemma V. 2 Consider the subgame G(2, s), where s > 0. For δ > s−1
s
, any
amount of delay including perpetual delay can be sustained in an equilibrium.7
Lemma KS. 1 Consider G(n, s) and, let s > 0 be a continuous surplus. For
δ ∈ (0, 1), the game has a unique and efficient equilibrium.8
We now analyse our model. Following two lemmas fix the limits to the payoff
of the player who proposes in the first period i.e. player 1.
Lemma 1 For G(n, s) and δ > s−1
s
, there exists an equilibrium such that the
game ends in period 1 with the proposer getting all s units.
6See Van Damme et al (1990, proposition 1) and Muthoo (1991, proposition 1). Although Van
Damme et al (1990, proposition 1) show any distribution such that each player gets at least one
unit is possible in equilibrium, it can be verified that the strategy profile stated in the proposition
constitutes an (weak nash) equilibrium even when either of the player gets zero.
7See Van Damme et al (1990, proposition 2).
8See Krishna and Serrano (1996, theorem 1).
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Proof. Following strategy profile, denoted by E(1), constitutes an equilibrium
and results into an outcome in which entire surplus goes to the proposer of the
first period.
E(1): When m ≥ 3 players are present, following strategies are played. A
proposer offers x ∈ X(m, s), and all the responders accept any offer ≥ 0.
When m = 2, proposer gets zero (this is supported by lemma V.1).
Clearly, it is optimal for the proposer of period 1 to offer zero to all other players.
Given all other responders are accepting zero, a responder accepts zero since re-
jecting the offers leads to bilateral bargaining in which he gets zero.
Lemma 2 For G(n, s) and δ > s−1
s
, there exists an equilibrium such that the
game ends in period 1 with the proposer getting zero units.
Proof. Following strategy profile, denoted by E(0), constitutes an equilibrium
and results into an outcome in which the proposer gets zero in period 1. Before
we state the strategy profile, note that the construction of equilibrium strategy
profile in subsequent propositions is very similar to E(0). Hence, understanding
E(0) will help in understanding rest of the equilibria.
E(0): Consider period 1. Player 1 offers a vector x ∈ X(n, s) such that
x1 = 0. If such a vector is offered, a responder i ∈ N \ {1} accepts ≥ xi.
If player 1, instead, offers x′ ∈ X(n, s) such that x′1 > 0, then a responder
i 6= 2 accepts ≥ x′i, and the responder i = 2 (i.e. player 2) rejects < s. In
the subgame starting period 2, following strategies are played. If player 1
offered himself zero in period 1 and only two player are remaining in period
2, then the proposer in period 2 gets zero (this is supported by lemma V.1),
otherwise the proposer gets the entire leftover surplus (this is supported by
lemma V.1 and lemma 1).
Note that if the player 1 deviates and offers himself x′1 > 0, it is profitable for
player 2 to reject 0 ≤ x′2 < s and get x′1 + x′2 in the next period since δ > s−1s .
This results in zero payoff for player 1, rendering the deviation unprofitable. Also,
given that player 1 offers himself zero and all other responders accept the proposal,
a responder must accept the proposal as well, otherwise he will find himself in a
bilateral bargaining in which he is punished by lemma V.1 and obtains zero.
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Following three propositions prove that any distribution of the surplus is possi-
ble and any amount of delay including perpetual delay is possible in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider G(n, s) and δ > s−1
s
. For every x ∈ X(n, s) there exists
an equilibrium such that the distribution x is obtained in period 1.
Proof. Following strategy profile, denoted by E(x), constitutes an equilibrium
and proves the proposition.
E(x): Consider period 1. Player 1 offers the distribution x ∈ X(n, s). A
responder i ∈ N \ {1} accepts ≥ xi. If player 1 deviates and offers a differ-
ent vector x′ ∈ X(n, s), then following strategies are played. If x′1 ≤ x1, a
responder i accepts ≥ x′i. However, if x′1 > x1, then a responder i 6= 2 ac-
cepts ≥ x′i. The responder i = 2 (i.e. player 2) rejects < s. In the subgame
starting period 2, following strategies are played. If player 1 offered himself
≤ x1 in period 1, then the proposer in period 2 gets zero (this is supported
by lemma V.1 and lemma 2). If player 1 offered himself > x1 in period 1,
then the proposer in period 2 gets entire leftover surplus (this is supported
by lemma V.1 and lemma 1).
Can player 1 deviate and offer himself more than the norm x1 i.e. x
′
1 > x1? If he
does so, it becomes profitable for player 2 to reject 0 ≤ x′2 < s and get x′1 + x′2
in the next period as δ > s−1
s
. This results in zero payoff for player 1. Hence, he
does not deviate.
Proposition 2 Consider G(n, s), δ > s−1
s
and t > 0. For every x ∈ X(n, s)
there exists an equilibrium such that the distribution x is obtained after a delay of
t periods.
Proof. Following strategy profile, denoted by E(x, t), constitutes an equilibrium
and proves the proposition.
E(x, t): From period 1 to t, following strategies are played. In a subgame
with m < n players, the proposer gets entire leftover surplus (this is sup-
ported by lemma V.1 and lemma 1). When n players are present, following
strategies are played. A proposer offers zero to rest of the players and a
responder accepts > 0. If a proposer i ∈ N deviates and offers a different
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vector x′ ∈ X(n, s), then following strategies are played. If x′i = 0, a re-
sponder j ∈ N \ {i} accepts ≥ xj . However, if x′i > 0, then a responder
j 6= (i + 1) accepts ≥ x′j , and the responder j = (i + 1) rejects < s. At
t+ 1, if m < n players are present the proposer gets entire leftover surplus
(this is supported by lemma V.1 and lemma 1), otherwise E(x) is played.
Observe that in first t periods and when n players are present, if a proposer i de-
viates and offers himself 0 < x′i < s, it is profitable for player i + 1 to reject
0 ≤ x′i+1 < s and get x′i + x′i+1 in the next period since δ > s−1s . This results in
zero payoff for player i, and hence, rendering the deviation useless.
Proposition 3 For G(n, s) and δ > s−1
s
, there exists an equilibrium which sup-
ports perpetual delay.
Proof. Consider following strategy profile, denoted by E(∞), which basically
extends the strategies specified for first t periods in E(x, t) to infinite number of
periods.
E(∞): In a subgame with m < n players, the proposer gets entire leftover
surplus (this is supported by lemma V.1 and lemma 1). When n players are
present, following strategies are played. A proposer offers zero to rest of
the players and a responder accepts > 0. If a proposer i ∈ N deviates and
offers a different vector x′ ∈ X(n, s), then following strategies are played.
If x′i = 0, a responder j ∈ N \ {i} accepts ≥ xj . However, if x′i > 0, then a
responder j 6= (i+1) accepts≥ x′j , and the responder j = (i+1) rejects< s.
It can be verified that E(∞) constitutes an equilibrium.
Compare above propositions with lemma KS.1. It is clear that the presence
of discrete surplus severely deteriorates the predictive ability of the model. Also,
observe the similarity in the propositions and the lemma V.1 and V.2. This shows
how strong is the effect of presence of discrete surplus. The reason why we get
these results is very simple. Lemma V.1 shows that extreme outcomes are possible
in a two person subgame i.e. one of the player obtains zero. Using lemma V.1 as
a punishment device, we are able to obtain lemma 1 and lemma 2, which itself
are extreme results, and hence potential punishment devices. We use these results
to punish deviations by proposer and responders from the specified strategy pro-
files in rest of the results. Hence, forcing the players to follow the specified path
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along the equilibrium. Such punishment devices do not exist when the surplus is
continuous, precisely because of the unique outcome, which is not extreme, in the
Rubinstein (1982) type bilateral bargaining.
4 Conclusion
Krishna and Serrano (1996) show that the “exit” feature establishes predictabil-
ity in the multilateral bargaining, which otherwise suffers from multiplicity of
equilibria and inefficiency. We, however, show that the predictability of the “exit”
model vanishes if the surplus is discrete and the players are sufficiently patient.
Van Damme et al (1990) and Muthoo (1991) show the same effect in bilateral bar-
gaining. Clearly, presence of discrete surplus severely and negatively affects the
predictability of a bargaining model. Hence, our work together with Van Damme
et al (1990) and Muthoo (1991) raise an important question, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Is there a (reasonable) modelling feature or condition which
can counter the effect of the discrete surplus in bargaining models?
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